Gas prices around the world vary widely despite being connected by international trade of lique…ed natural gas (LNG). Some industry observers argue that major exporters have acted irrationally by not arbitraging prices. This is also di¢ cult to reconcile with a competitive model in which regional price di¤erences exist solely because of transport costs. We show that a model which incorporates market power can rationalize observed prices and trade ‡ows. Rough estimates for short-term sales by Qatar suggest Lerner indices of 63% and 33%, respectively, for Japan and the UK. We highlight how different features of the LNG market limit the ability and/or incentive of other players to engage in arbitrage, and discuss the potential impact of US LNG exports.
Introduction
Motivation for the analysis. Not so long ago, there was a widespread conjecture that gas prices around the world would converge. The idea was that sea-based trade in lique…ed natural gas (LNG) would connect regional markets-notably Asia, Europe, and the US-and thereby link their pricing. The volume of LNG trade has indeed grown signi…cantly since the early 2000s, against the backdrop of liberalization of electricity and gas industries, and an increase in demand for natural gas.
Global investment in LNG infrastructure-liquefaction and regasi…cation capacityhas risen, and such facilities are now spread across more countries. The size of the LNG tanker ‡eet has expanded signi…cantly, and transport costs have fallen. 1 Importantly, too, contracting arrangements between buyers and sellers have become more ‡exible. Traditionally, an LNG project involves a bilateral long-term contract, say of a 20-year duration, between a buyer and seller, to back up the initial investment. However, there is an ongoing shift towards trade in spot and short-term markets; these have increased ten-fold since 2000 and now make up 25% of total LNG sales (GIIGNL, 2012) . 2 This development has been aided, amongst other things, by the adoption of Master Sales Agreements for LNG, which create standardization and reduce transaction costs.
Yet gas prices around the world have varied widely; signi…cant price di¤erentials have existed for years, and have become more pronounced since the Fukushima accident of March 2011 (IGU, 2013) . The 2012 average natural gas price was roughly US$16/MMBtu in Japan, $9 in Europe but only $3 in the US. Some expect large price disparities to persist, including the International Energy Agency in modelling scenarios for 2020 and 2035. In short, the gas market appears far from global.
For the case of the US, the reasons for price divergence are quite clear. First, the 1 Useful overviews of the LNG industry as of the mid 2000s are provided by Jensen (2003) and Yergin and Stoppard (2003) , with a focus, respectively, on economics and geopolitics. 2 Brito and Hartley (2007) argue that the expectation of a shift towards short-term multilateral trading can have self-ful…lling properties. large-scale emergence of shale gas over the last few years has put strong downward pressure on US natural gas prices. Second, the US at present only has very limited LNG export capability; its infrastructure still re ‡ects the assumption of the 2000s that the US would become a major LNG importer. As a result, the US market has been largely isolated from the rest of the world. 3 The other price gaps require a di¤erent explanation, and some industry observers have argued they imply that LNG exporters have been behaving "irrationally".
Several major LNG exporters make short-term sales to Asia but simultaneously supply Northwest Europe at far lower prices. This behaviour may appear irrational in that it entails a forgone pro…t = jprice di¤erentialj quantity sold to the lowerpriced market. For Qatari short-term sales to the UK, rather than to Japan, some estimates suggest a forgone pro…t of up to $100 million per day (in late 2011), and a cumulative …gure in the billions over the period from April 2011 to April 2012. 4 LNG producers are, apparently, failing to engage in price arbitrage by not exiting the European market (at least for short-term sales).
The most immediate explanation for price divergence lies in transport costs. In particular, a simple perfectly competitive model predicts that the price di¤erence across two regions served by an exporter equals the di¤erence in the associated transport costs. Put di¤erently, the "netback"-that is, price minus transport costfor the exporter should be the same for each region.
The problem with this theory is that it cannot explain the kinds of price di¤erences observed over the last years. Consider again the case of Qatar, which is the largest LNG producer with a global market share of around 30%. Figure 1 shows the di¤erential between the Platts JKM (Japan Korea Marker) price for Asian LNG and the UK NBP (National Balancing Point) price, plotted against the di¤erence in transport costs between shipping from Qatar to Japan and Qatar to the UK, Gas price differential (JKM -NBP) Transport cost differential (Japan -UK) US$/ MMBtu respectively. 5, 6 Prices are up to $10/MMBtu higher in Asia than in the UK, while the corresponding transport costs are approximately identical. Perfect competition, by contrast, predicts that these two di¤erentials should coincide. 7, 8 The perfectly competitive model cannot account for other producers'behaviour.
For example, Peru is in a similar position to Qatar in that its Europe-Asia transportcost di¤erentials are usually very small (Platts, 2012) , and yet it makes short-term sales to both markets (GIIGNL, 2012) . For other major producers, such as Nigeria and Trinidad & Tobago, transport costs to Asia are indeed higher (by around $2-3.50/MMBtu) but still often not su¢ cient to explain observed sales and prices. 5 Qatari sales to Japan and UK are the two largest routes of short-term LNG, with global shares of 10% and 6% respectively (GIIGNL, 2012).
6 Source: Calculations based on data from Platts, Poten & Partners, and ICAP (via Bloomberg) . 7 This theoretical prediction should not be taken too literally. Temporary deviations are to be expected in the face of short-term demand and supply shocks. However, large price divergences persisting for several years are di¢ cult to reconcile with this theory. 8 The simple theory also fails to explain the data on two broader counts. First, over large parts of the sample period (early 2010 until early 2013) it even predicts the wrong sign: transport costs to the UK are typically slightly higher than to Japan, while prices are much lower. Second, there is "excess volatility": transport costs are far too stable to be able to explain the observed volatility of (relative) gas prices.
Overview of the results. In this paper, we instead suggest that regional price di¤erentials arise because of LNG exporters'market power. Consider a producer who can sell uncommitted LNG into two export markets. In general, pro…t-maximization implies that the producer equalizes marginal revenue, net of the marginal cost of production and transport, across the two markets. If transport costs are identicalas is roughly the case for Qatar's sales to the UK and Japan-then export quantities are such that marginal revenues for each region are equal.
The key point is simply that equalizing marginal revenue is not necessarily the same thing as equalizing price. Put di¤erently, for an exporter with market power, the "arbitrage" process stops when its marginal revenues are equalized; this may optimally leave prices across markets far apart. This argument extends straightforwardly to more than two export markets and to capacity constraints on production; moreover, it does not depend on any particular mode of strategic competition (such as Cournot-Nash competition). 9 We provide a simple new formula for relative prices between any two export markets, in terms of a seller's transport costs and price elasticities of demand. It deals with a key challenge-the shortage of available data on LNG markets. In particular, our basic approach does not rely on production cost data, or on any assessment of whether or not an exporter is capacity-constrained. Also, while our exposition focuses on gas and LNG, it will become clear that our approach and results could also …nd application in other contexts, including markets with di¤erentiated products. Market power can thus rationalize observed gas prices and trade ‡ows by tracing them to local demand conditions. The Fukushima accident, for instance, e¤ectively switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power, leading to an increase in demand for imported LNG to "…ll the gap". (Local demand conditions play no role in the competitive model, in which price di¤erences are solely driven by transport costs.) 9 We do not suggest that LNG producers are colluding, but rather that at least some of them have a degree of market power (i.e., are not textbook price-takers) in some of their export markets. See Egging, Holz, von Hirschhausen and Gabriel (2009) for a recent analysis of "Gas OPEC".
Our rough empirical estimates for Qatar yield Lerner indices (price-cost mark-ups) of around 63% for short-term LNG sales to Japan compared to 33% for sales to the UK (in 2012). We discuss in detail how di¤erent features of the LNG market limit the ability and/or incentive of other players (such as LNG buyers and third-party traders) to engage in price arbitrage, including constraints in LNG shipping.
We can o¤er a perspective on the possibility that the US will become a large LNG exporter over the coming years. What is the likely impact on gas prices?
Our analysis makes clear that US and non-US prices will not necessarily converge as a result, even allowing for transport costs. It also suggests that any model of the e¤ect of US LNG exports is likely to be incomplete if it does not take market power into account. For example, an in ‡uential recent model-based simulation for the US Department of Energy incorporates general-equilibrium e¤ects but assumes that LNG producers do not respond strategically to US market entry. 10
Our model of price discrimination with imperfect competition is static and thus does not explicitly capture intertemporal features of the gas market (such as storage). 11 In practice, there may be a dynamic interaction between short-term prices and long-term contracts. (Our model examines pricing incentives in short-term markets, taking long-term commitments as given.) In particular, a large proportion of LNG imports is still governed by long-term contracts whose terms may be renegotiated from time to time. Some producers may have been reluctant to push down short-term prices in Asia insofar as this would make it more di¢ cult to sustain "high" prices on long-term contracts in the future. At its core, this argument has a similar ‡avour to ours; while our model is based on exporters' market power in short-term markets, this argument is essentially about exporters'bargaining power in negotiations of long-term contracts. 10 NERA (2012) assumes Qatar is "large"but does not alter its production strategy in response to US exports, while other producers are represented as a competitive fringe; the model is augmented with (exogenous) mark-up adjustments in order to be able to replicate observed regional gas prices. 11 See Chaton and Durant-Viel (2013) for a recent analysis of the value of gas storage when …rms have market power.
Related literature. A number of empirical papers have examined price convergence in natural gas markets, though few of these focus speci…cally on LNG. 12 Siliverstovsa et al. (2005) obtain mixed results from a cointegration analysis using data from the early 1990s until 2004; they …nd evidence for market integration between European and Japanese markets, but no integration between North America and Japan. Over the period 1999 to 2008 , Neumann (2009 …nds increased convergence of gas spot prices between North America and Asia. 13 Others have focused on price convergence within regional markets; for example, Doane and Spulber (1994) employ similar techniques to …nd an integrated, national market for natural gas in the US. 14 By contrast, we o¤er an economic-theory perspective on price non-convergence, including a view to explaining observed prices since March 2011.
There are also several recent simulation-based models of gas-market integration in the EU, see, e.g., Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008) and Lise and Hobbs (2009) . Newbery (2008) examines the impact of carbon pricing on market power in the EU gas market (but does not consider LNG trade). We also employ the standard non-cooperative approach to pricing strategies; see Hubert and Ikkonikova (2011) for a recent application of cooperative game theory to bargaining and investment in natural gas markets.
Finally, there is related literature on market power in crude oil which estimates the level of market competitiveness with a particular emphasis on the role of OPEC, see, e.g., Salant (1976) , Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2011) , and Nakov and Nuño (2013) . Most oil models simply assume a single global oil price; indeed, international price di¤erentials in crude oil are typically small and mainly re ‡ect quality di¤erences between oil varieties from di¤erent regions. In contrast, this paper 12 Stern (2012) provides a detailed overview of how gas-pricing mechanisms vary across regions. 13 There does not appear to be any econometric analysis of gas-price convergence post-2011. We conjecture that international price correlations have declined signi…cantly (compared to the mid/late 2000s), and that the Fukushima accident represents a structural break.
14 There are also several recent simulation-based models of gas-market integration in the EU, see, e.g., Holz, von Hirschhausen and Kemfert (2008) and Lise and Hobbs (2009) . Also related is Newbery (2008) who examines the impact of carbon pricing on market power in the EU gas market (but does not consider LNG trade). focuses on natural gas, for which the existing literature-and the market-is much less well-developed; it obtains results that apply for a wide range of competitive conditions, and focuses explicitly on the limits to international price arbitrage in LNG.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of pricing across di¤erent export markets, and gives some empirical estimates for the case of Qatar.
Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of limits to arbitrage in global LNG markets.
Section 4 o¤ers concluding remarks on the potential e¤ects of more LNG arbitrage, in the future, on prices, industry pro…ts, and social welfare-and thereby highlights several shortcomings of the existing literature on third-degree price discrimination.
A pro…t-maximizing LNG exporter
Setup of the model. Consider an LNG producer selling output into M 2 export markets. Let p k (x k ; y k ; X k ; Y k ; `) denote the inverse demand function producer k faces in market`(i = 1; ::; M ), where p k is the "spot" price of LNG, 15
x k is the quantity sold by the producer in the short-term market, while y k is the quantity the producer has pre-committed to sell in market`by way of long-term contracts (which we here take as given). Analogously, X k is the vector of outputs sold by other producers in the spot market while Y k captures their long-term commitments. 16 Other factors that a¤ect demand in market i are summarized by the vector `. For example, this might include prices of pipeline-based gas, coal, oil and other substitutes, the business cycle, other demand shocks, and the weather. 17
The producer's cost function C k ( P M =1 (x k + y k )) depends on the sum of total quantities sold in all M export markets, including spot market sales as well as long-term commitments. Production may be subject to a capacity constraint such that 18 In addition to this, the producer incurs a market-speci…c transport cost k per unit of output sold to market`. 19 This mainly re ‡ects the cost of shipping and may vary across export markets depending on distance and other factors (and also vary across di¤erent producers).
Producer k's pro…t-maximization problem is to choose the amount of LNG to export to each market, given any long-term commitments already entered into:
We assume, without much loss of additional economic insight, that this problem is well-behaved with an interior solution for each of the M export markets. The
Langrangean for constrained optimization can be written as
, where k 0 is the shadow value of the capacity constraint (i.e., the value of an incremental relaxation of the capacity constraint), which is non-zero if the producer is capacity-constrained and zero if it is not.
Pro…t-maximization analysis. The optimal output choice b x k by producer k in market`satis…es the …rst-order condition M R k M C k k k = 0, where M R k is marginal revenue from short-term sales, and M C k is the marginal cost of production.
Using the …rst-order conditions for any two export markets, say i and j, shows that these are related by
This is the fundamental condition for pro…t-maximization. The cost of an additional unit of output is the same regardless where it ends up being sold, both in terms 18 Adding a production constraint in terms of minimum throughput to ensure smooth operation, P M =1 (x k + y k ) Q k , would not a¤ect the following results. 19 The results would remain unchanged with an a¢ ne transport cost function of the form T`+ k x k , where T`represents a …xed cost. of the marginal cost of production and the shadow value of using the capacity elsewhere. (This holds regardless of whether or not the producer is, in fact, capacityconstrained.) To maximize pro…ts, therefore, the producer balances at the margin the contribution of each export market in terms of sales revenue and transport costs.
So marginal revenue net of transport costs is equalized across export markets.
Marginal revenue in market`can be written as
is the own-price elasticity of producer k's demand. From here on, this elasticity is understood to be evaluated at producer k's optimally chosen output b
x k , as well as at the actual levels of short-term output of other producers and corresponding actual
Proposition 1 A pro…t-maximizing producer k sells into M 2 export markets with a common marginal cost (and possibly subject to a capacity constraint):
(A) In any two markets i and j, pro…t-maximizing prices (p k i ; p k j ) satisfy
where ( k i ; k j ) are transport costs and ( k i ; k j ) are own-price elasticities of demand;
(B) Any observed prices (p k i ; p k j ) and transport costs ( k i ; k j ) in markets i and j can be rationalized by some values for the price elasticities of demand ( k i ; k j ).
Proof. For (A), rewrite the fundamental equation for pro…t-maximization M R k
from which the result for the relative price (p k i p k j )=p k j follows immediately.
which decreases in the elasticity k i , and hence satis…es (p k i k
given the limiting cases, respectively, of k i ! 1 and k i ! 1. So any price and transport cost satisfying p k i k i can be rationalized for some marginal production (shadow) cost M C k + k 0 and an appropriately chosen elasticity k i . The same argument applies for market j.
Understanding pro…t-maximizing prices. The formula for relative prices from (A) is rather general: it does not rely on any speci…c functional-form assumptions on demand and cost functions (e.g., linear, constant-elasticity, etc.), or on a particular form of competitive conduct in each export markets. Commonly-used models, e.g., perfect competition, monopoly, Cournot-Nash oligopoly, dominant …rm with a competitive fringe, etc., are nested as special cases; the mode of competition may di¤er across export markets. 21 An informational advantage is that it does not feature production costs. (The result also does not assume that either consumers or other producers are payo¤-maximizers; their behaviour, rational or otherwise, is fully captured by the producer's own-price elasticities of demand across markets.)
To understand the properties of the model, consider a few special cases:
First, the simple perfectly competitive model is nested where the producer's demand elasticity k ! 1 in each export market`= 1; ::; M . This corresponds to a situation in which the producer is a price taker without any market power (so its 21 Although we do not emphasize this aspect here, the same result would also apply to the twostage setting of Allaz and Vila (1993) , where …rms, in the …rst stage, can commit to selling output in forward markets, and, then, in the second stage, choose their production levels. While the present paper focuses on global gas pricing, the result from Proposition 1 could also …nd application in other settings, both "commodity"markets and those in which …rms'products are signi…cantly di¤erentiated.
Rationalizing observed prices. Part (B) of the result is that the model with market power can rationalize any observed price di¤erences between export markets.
The reason is as follows. Appropriate choice of the price elasticity for market`can generate any non-negative price-cost margin, ranging from zero (when k ! 1) to arbitrarily large (when k ! 1), regardless of the underlying details of the producer's costs. (A negative price-cost margin cannot be pro…t-maximizing in the present model.) So it is always possible to …nd an elasticity to rationalize the observed price in any market, and thus also to generate correct relative prices across markets.
Consider a numerical example based on LNG sales to Asia and Northwest Europe (i = Asia, j = NW Europe). Let prices p k i = 16 and p k j = 9, and assume, for simplicity, that transport costs for producer k are identical, k i = k j = b . Such prices can thus be explained by the producer having relatively greater market power in Asia, that is, k i < k j . Indeed, it is not di¢ cult to check that these relative prices can be rationalized by a pair of elasticities k i = 2 and k j = 9. (Note that the precise value of b does not matter for this to hold.) Clearly, similar examples can also be constructed to explain the behaviour of other producers in other markets, including for cases where k i 6 = k j .
So recent claims that major LNG exporters are acting irrationally by simultaneously selling short-term cargoes to both Northwest Europe and Asian markets are not necessarily correct. It can be entirely rational for a pro…t-maximizing seller to pursue a strategy that leaves prices in Japan far higher, in response to stronger demand. In e¤ect, it uses sales to the Europe to keep prices in Asia high. 22
Why might producers have greater market power in Asia, notably Japan? The Fukushima accident e¤ectively switched o¤ large parts of Japanese nuclear power, leading to an increase in demand for imported LNG so as to "…ll the gap". From the viewpoint of an individual LNG seller with a degree of market power, under fairly general conditions, an upward shift in market demand (captured formally by a change in i ) translates into a lower price elasticity of demand. This, in turn, typically leads to an increase in quantity of LNG supplied but also to an increase in 22 It is also economically ine¢ cient in that di¤erent consumers are paying di¤erent prices for essentially the same good (so their marginal utilities are unequal). its price, as is consistent with market experience since Fukushima. 23 To illustrate, consider a Cournot-Nash model of export market i in which N i 2 …rms face a common demand curve p i (X i ; i ) = i +f i (X i ), where X i P k x k i , and i shifts consumers'willingness-to-pay, and suppose producer k has constant marginal
Summing over all …rms and rearranging gives
Di¤erentiating with respect to a positive demand shock d i > 0 shows that equilibrium demand/imports rise since
where the denominator is positive by the stability of equilibrium. The market price responds according to dp
So the condition for price to rise-and producer-speci…c elasticities to fall-is:
The latter condition requires that demand is "not too convex"(around equilibrium) and is satis…ed, for example, by any linear or concave demand curve. More formally, 23 Another potential explanation-albeit one rejected by the available data-is that capacity constraints in an importing country's regasi…cation infrastructure drive price above marginal cost. This could explain regional price divergences even in the absence of market power. At a global level, however, the rate of capacity utilisation of regasi…cation terminals has been stable, and rather low, at around 40% since 2000. In Japan, annual LNG imports increased by 24% between 2010 and 2012 without signi…cant capacity additions; indeed utilisation rates rose only moderately up to 49%. Utilisation is higher for some importing countries, notably China and India, but at a similar or lower level for other such as Argentina, Korea and the UK. (All based on data in IGU, 2013.) 24 For simplicity, this illustration assumes away long-term contracts and third-party arbitrage with other markets (although the points made would apply more generally). it corresponds to "log-concavity" of demand, that is, the direct demand curve is such that log D i (p i ) is concave in price, which is a common assumption in economic theory. In this sense, higher demand exacerbates sellers'market power. By contrast, in a competitive market dp i =d i = 0, given constant returns to scale. 25 More generally, it is frequently suggested that Asian buyers are more concerned about "security of supply" than European buyers. This translates into a higher willingness-to-pay for a unit of LNG and, all else equal, lower elasticities. Furthermore, Asian buyers have fewer possibilities to substitute for LNG, notably because of more limited access to Russian pipeline gas.
Estimating producer-speci…c demand elasticities. A feature of the above model is that the pair of elasticities to rationalize the data is, in general, not unique.
In the above numerical example, the data p k i = 16, p k j = 9, and k i = k j = b are rationalized for any pair of elasticities ( k i , k j ) that satis…es (1 k i = k j )=( k i 1) = 7 9 . Setting ( k i , k j ) = (2; 9) is but one solution; setting ( k i , k j ) = (1 1 2 ; 2 5 11 ) is another. Loosely put, getting the relative elasticities across markets correct matters more than their absolute values. Note, however, that certain bounds on elasticities must be satis…ed. To see this, let k i = k j = b , and, suppose, without loss of generality that p k i > p k j . To be able to rationalize these data, the producer-speci…c elasticity for market i must be su¢ ciently low in that k i < p k i =(p k i p k j ).
Pinning down unique values for the elasticities requires more information and/or additional modelling assumptions. We here discuss two approaches, which may be substitutes or complements, and give some rough estimates of Qatar's market power.
First, recall that the above results did not rely on production cost information, or on any knowledge of whether the producer is, in fact, capacity-constrained.
However, if such information is available, this immediately identi…es the producer-speci…c demand elasticity. To see this, rewrite the …rst-order condition for pro…tmaximization in market`, using the relationship M R k = p k 1 1 k , to obtain
. In addition to prices (p k i ,p k j ) and transport costs ( k i , k j ), knowledge of (M C k + k ) would identify each of the elasticities, k i and k j , and yield a unique way of rationalizing the data. In the above numerical example, for instance, knowledge that M C k + k = 6 would select ( k i , k j ) = (2; 9) as the unique solution. Perhaps most realistically, an assessment that the producer is not capacity-constrained, i.e., k = 0, together with data on (p k , k ,M C k ) identi…es k for each individual market. 26 We here present some illustrative results for the case of Qatari exports to Japan and the UK during 2012 (p k i = 16, p k j = 9). These are based on indicative cost estimates in IEA (2009), which give the combined unit cost of production, liquefaction, and regasi…cation of LNG at around $3.00/MMBtu in 2008 US$. 27, 28 We here assume that Qatar is not capacity-constrained ( k = 0), and take this estimate as a proxy for its marginal cost. To account for possible cost in ‡ation between 2008 and 2012, we employ M C k = 3:90 (corresponding to year-on-year cost increases of just under 7%). For transport costs, we rely on the data used above and set k i = 2:10 for Japan, and k j = 2:15 for the UK market (based on 2012 averages).
Taken together, this information yields estimates of the producer-speci…c elasticities k i = 1 3 5 and k j = 3 3 59 . These can be equivalently expressed as Lerner indices
63% for Japan and L k j = ( k j ) 1 ' 33% for the UK. We emphasize that these market-power estimates are only indicative; however, even accounting for potential shortcomings in the assumptions and data, it seems clear that (i) price-cost margins are signi…cant for 26 Put di¤erently, for each seller, there are M …rst-order conditions but M + 2 unknowns, namely, k M =1 , M C k , and k , but since M C k + k is a su¢ cient statistic for (M C k ; k ) the system boils down to M + 1 unknowns. 27 IEA (2009) is the only publicly available source of (fairly) recent LNG cost data we have been able to access. 28 The unit cost of production for Qatar is estimated to be close to zero, as project costs are taken to be covered by the output of gas condensate and other liquids, so the large bulk of costs stems from liquefaction and regasi…cation. both markets, and (ii) margins are considerably higher in Japan than for the UK. Second, it may be possible to justify more speci…c assumptions on competitive conduct. For instance, it is quite common in the analysis of natural gas markets to assume Cournot-Nash competition between sellers. Then an individual producer k's demand elasticity k = i =s k i , where i is the price elasticity of market demand and s k 2 (0; 1) is the producer's market share-in the appropriately de…ned market . Conditional on settling the issue of market de…nition, data on market shares are generally easier to obtain, and it is usually easier to estimate a market-level elasticity than a producer-speci…c elasticity (or a set of producer elasticities).
This second approach can act as a substitute for the previous production-cost approach, namely as an alternative way of pinning down the precise value of k for each seller in each market. But it can also be used in conjunction with the …rst approach to test the validity of particular models of competition. More speci…cally, it could be used to (i) provide a direct estimate, even in the absence of any data on prices or costs, of k for a producer-market pairing; (ii) select a preferred pair from the set of producer-speci…c elasticities ( k i , k j ) obtained using our basic model which utilizes data on prices and transport costs; (iii) test whether a particular model of competition, say Cournot-Nash, is consistent with the values of ( k i , k j ) obtained by our …rst approach using production-cost information.
To illustrate using our numerical example from above, suppose it is estimated that two markets have identical overall price elasticities i = j = 1 2 (say for natural gas, obtained both via LNG and pipelines where available); the producer-speci…c elasticities ( k i , k j ) = (2; 9) would then be generated by producer k having market shares (s k i ,s k j ) = (25%; 5 5 9 %) respectively in the two markets. Alternatively, if the producer had identical market shares s k i = s k j = 10%, then the corresponding market-level elasticities would be ( i , j ) = ( 1 5 ; 9 10 ). To summarize, we have presented a basic model that requires only minimal information on prices and transport costs. This model can be augmented using additional input data on production costs and/or competitive conditions. 29 We have derived some illustrative estimates of Qatar's short-term market power in Japan and the UK. It is clear that the general methodology could easily be applied to other producers and trade routes insofar as su¢ cient data were available to the analyst. We return to the impact of price discrimination under di¤erent competitive conditions in our concluding remarks below.
Limits to price arbitrage in LNG markets
Our model o¤ers an explanation for why it may be optimal for prices across regions to be di¤erent from the viewpoint of an LNG producer. Implicit in the model, as in virtually all literature on price discrimination, is that other players do not undermine this sales strategy. We here discuss a number of reasons, many particular to LNG markets, that either limit the ability of other players to engage in arbitrage or create incentives that work against pursuing arbitrage in the …rst place.
The textbook assumption that sustains price discrimination by a seller is that buyers cannot engage in resale. Although there is a trend towards more ‡exible LNG contracting arrangements, some "destination restrictions" appear to persist.
For example, it is said that state-controlled LNG producers still normally restrict the resale of their exports in a way that prevents "secondary"trading on commodity exchanges. This means that some price arbitrage opportunities, if they exist, cannot be exploited for contractual reasons.
LNG arbitrage may also be di¢ cult because of limited shipping capacity. 30 Although there now are on the order of 400 vessels for transporting LNG, only a small 29 It is also possible, in principle, to estimate the elasticity for an individual markets, k , or the entire vector of elasticities k M =1 , using econometric techniques. This would require time-series data on prices and quantities in each market of interest (probably ideally panel data), as well as control variables (probably including data on producers'long-term contractual commitments). 30 Our model assumes that an LNG producer takes transport costs as given when choosing its sales strategy, and that transport is available for any desired export volume to any market. Moreover, our numerical illustrations use publicly available shipping rates as being representative.
proportion of the ‡eet is uncommitted, in the sense of not being tied to a long-term sales contract. Thus only few companies appear to have direct access to both uncommitted gas supplies and uncommitted LNG tankers. So an LNG buyer wishing to engage in price arbitrage may …nd that the shipping market is either unable or unwilling to provide transport at the required price. 31 Note that this latter argument has some similarity to our model from above; it involves market power in the shipping market rather than (or in addition to) the LNG market itself. 32 Commissioning a new LNG carrier is a costly and uncertain undertaking, with a signi…cant time lag due to construction ("time to build").
In addition to this, there are at least two reasons to do with vertical structure for why arbitrage, even if possible, may not be in the interest of an LNG buyer. First, while redirecting cargo, say, from Northwest Europe to Japan may promise a higher price, it also means that the LNG buyer can no longer sell or use the gas further downstream in the European market. So redirecting cargo may also forgo downstream surplus, which works against the incentive to arbitrage. 33 Second, ownership arrangements along the LNG supply chain are much more complex than in any simple model. Several LNG players hold partial (<100%) ownership stakes at various points along the supply chain-including in LNG production and liquefaction, shipping, regasi…cation, and downstream gas-as well as across di¤erent countries. Put simply, a company may be an LNG seller in country A, an LNG buyer in country B, and have an infrastructure stake in country C. Such a player's overall pro…t function-and hence incentive structure-is more di¢ cult to work out. However, it seems plausible that the overall incentive sometimes works against arbitrage. In any case, vertical issues mean that a simple comparison of netbacks may not be enough.
If neither LNG sellers nor LNG buyers have a strong incentive to engage in price 31 In some cases, there may also be compability issues; not all import terminals are able to receive deliveries from all types of LNG tankers. 32 There is also a potential feedback e¤ect: Short-term LNG typically involves longer distances than trade from long-term contracts, so more price arbitrage tends to further tighten the shipping market, and may thus to some extent undermine itself. Thanks to Philipp Koenig for this point. 33 We do not have data on downstream margins of integrated LNG players.
arbitrage, what about third parties such as traders? A recent industry report o¤ers an interesting perspective on this question: "The entry barriers to LNG trading are surprisingly high-new entrants require more than just experienced traders and trading systems. They must have access to cargoes, but the market's liquidity is typically held captive by the LNG liquefaction owners/upstream suppliers who are understandably very reluctant to release volumes for traders to trade with. Traders must also have access to shipping, either via owned vessels or the charter market.
Furthermore, certain ships can unload at certain terminals (e.g., many import terminals cannot accommodate Q-Max vessels). This can make it even more di¢ cult to e¢ ciently connect volumes to buyers" (JP Morgan Cazenove, 2012). That is, physical arbitrage requires su¢ cient capacities along the entire supply chain; almost by de…nition, this is more di¢ cult for third parties to secure.
It is worth highlighting a few other considerations which, in practice, can make LNG arbitrage di¢ cult and …nancially risky-and are typically neglected in models of price discrimination. The …rst is units. While the ‡ow of gas is, in some sense, continuous, the economics of LNG transport involves an indivisibility: the unit of account is, in e¤ect, a tanker. As a result, only players with su¢ ciently "deep pockets" can enter the market. The second is time. It can take two weeks, for example, to ship LNG from Qatar to Japan. Given the volatility of gas prices, it is possible for there to be a signi…cant shift in relative prices over such a period of time. So risk management becomes an important factor, both for LNG sales and potential arbitrage activity. Although …nancial instruments for natural gas exist, the derivatives market speci…cally for LNG is relatively underdeveloped at present.
Financial arbitrage, in general, can also be a¤ected by the existence of agency costs and capital constraints (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
Finally, the extent of price arbitrage in international gas markets may be limited because arbitrageurs themselves have a degree of market power. This can result from a combination of the "lumpiness"of LNG trade and barriers to entry discussed above. In such cases, the optimal way to exploit a pro…table trading opportunity does not lead to prices being equalized, precisely because the arbitrageur realizes that her actions have a non-zero e¤ect on prices. 34 For example, the optimal arbitrage strategy b arg max f [p i ( ) p j ( )]g of buying units in low-price market j to sell in high-price market i leaves p i ( b ) 6 = p j (b ) whenever the arbitrageur has market power in at least one of the two markets.
Taken together, these arguments suggests that, there are signi…cant limits to the scale of arbitrage activity which mean that gas price di¤erentials-perhaps due to market power in the LNG supply chain-have persisted. Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel and Wolfram (2008) on pricing in Californian electricity markets around the time of the Enron collapse; they show that arbitrage oppurtunities existed between spot and forward markets but suggest these were left unexploited due to a combination of market power and arbitrageurs'fear of regulatory penalties. and UK markets. We have argued that, in addition, a combination of incentives, market power, and other constraints tends to work against international price arbitrage by LNG buyers and third-party traders.
Concluding discussion
So is gas a global market? This is partly a matter of de…nition. Yes, in the sense that several LNG exporters sell into almost all major markets (except the US), and thus connect their pricing-albeit imperfectly. No, in that there is currently no clear tendency towards a single uniform gas price (even adjusted for transport costs).
Looking ahead, a number of recent developments, on balance, suggest that the gas market may become (even) more global. Signi…cant low-cost capacity may emerge in form of LNG exports based on US shale gas, as well as from Russian export capacity. Yet other LNG projects, notably in Australia, have higher-thanprojected costs which may dampen future supply. Production is also becoming more ‡exible; ‡oating liquefaction plant and tankers with onboard regasi…cation capabilities should make output more responsive to relative prices, and recent plans in Japan to introduce LNG futures contracts would facilitate hedging and arbitrage.
A natural question therefore is, how will greater LNG arbitrage a¤ect the global gas market? The existing theoretical literature on third-degree price discrimination o¤ers some partial answers. 35 It focuses on the e¤ect of moving from "uniform pricing", where …rms are forced (e.g., by regulation) to set identical prices in all markets, to price discrimination, where there are no such constraints on relative prices. Turned on its head, it therefore addresses the impact of an extreme scenario: moving from unconstrained price discrimination by LNG exporters to a world with perfect, costless arbitrage and a single gas price.
Much of the literature focuses on the case of a monopoly selling into two separate markets with di¤erent demand conditions (but identical marginal cost); see Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) for a recent analysis. Under fairly mild conditions, the resulting uniform price lies between the high and low prices under discrimination. 35 Stole (2007) provides a useful overview of this literature.
Moreover, price discrimination is usually associated with lower aggregate consumer surplus (across both markets)-although there are exceptions (Cowan, 2012). 36 By revealed preference, moving to perfect arbitrage makes a monopolist worse o¤.
The situation is more complex for price-setting oligopoly, and the literature highlights the possibility that price discrimination may reduce industry pro…ts (Corts, 1998) . So it is at least conceivable that a shift to a global gas price might be positive for LNG exporters (as a group). The impact of price discrimination on social welfare is, in general, ambiguous, and depends, amongst other things, on the …ne details of the demand conditions across di¤erent markets. 37 In the monopoly case, price discrimination is often welfare-reducing-but it is probably more likely to increase welfare under oligopoly. So a move to perfect arbitrage may actually cause global welfare to fall; in any case, it is clear that important distributional e¤ects arise.
However, the assumptions made to obtain these results limit their applicability to gas markets. First, virtually all of the existing literature focuses on monopoly or price-setting duopoly, neither of which seems a natural choice for LNG markets. Second, most papers simply assume that …rms supply all markets regardless of the degree of price discrimination; this precludes the possibility, for example, that greater price arbitrage might lead to some markets becoming so unattractive to exporters that they are no longer served. 38 Third, it is typically assumed that each producer has the same marginal cost for each market; this e¤ectively rules out the existence of transport costs, which almost inevitably vary across markets. 39 Fourth, particular features of LNG market such as the existence of long-term contracting 36 A smaller number of papers examine third-degree price discrimination by price-setting oligopolies with di¤erentiated products. With symmetric …rms, the basic insights from the monopoly case carry over (Holmes, 1989) . However, a richer range of outcomes is possible if …rms are asymmetric in that they do not rank di¤erent markets in the same way, that is, a market is regarded as "strong"by one …rm but as "weak"by another …rm (Corts, 1998) . It is then possible that price discrimination causes prices in both markets to move in the same direction. 37 See Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2013) for a novel welfare analysis for monopoly. 38 An exception is Layson (1994) who analyzes market opening in the monopoly case. 39 We conjecture that greater price arbitrage can have important implications for cost e¢ ciency, both in terms of production costs and transport costs. A recent paper by Chen and Schwartz (2013) shows that price discrimination is more likely to raise welfare in the monopoly case when there are marginal-cost asymmetries across markets. Thanks to Simon Cowan for the pointer. commitments and its complex supply chain and ownership structure are not modelled. Finally, from a dynamic perspective, the higher pro…ts that …rms may derive from the ability to price discriminate can increase their incentives to invest in LNG infrastructure in the …rst place.
For future research, it would clearly be useful to have more formal results from models of price discrimination with more realistic market structures that can be applied to natural gas-and elsewhere. Thereby, LNG markets seem a fruitful research area, given their increasing importance and the relative scarcity of existing literature. It would be particularly interesting to combine economic theory with more extensive market data.
